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Abstract— A model is described and implemented, with the purpose of representing non-equity collaboration dynamics among 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs). In the real world these links are stable, but not strong. In this context the strong links are 
joint-ventures and participation exchanges, while non-equity collaboration (as a consortium) are stable, but leaving each enterprise 
as an autonomous entity. In particular, the governance of SMEs remains independent, but in the long term we observe a co-
evolution of strategies among the enterprises which take part in the collaborative network. These activities could be the basis for a 
network formation and/or impact the topology of an existing network. In this work an agent based model is introduced, aiming to 
explore the dynamics behind network formation among SMEs. (Abstract) 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The features of Socio-Economical environment in which 
the enterprise acts considerably affect its productive choices, 
the decisional models, internal organization and the relations 
with other enterprises.  The key point of every Economical 
activity should be an aptitude to second and favour market 
changes. 
Today, enterprises operate in dynamic markets where 
acquisition problems of productive factors constantly change 
along with the new technologies, customers’ needs, peculiar 
features of demand in different sectors,  internal situation of 
the enterprise (financial, economical and organizational), 
social conditions of the country, and so on. 
Concentration is the typical phenomenon of present 
industrial society; the enterprises try to reach a more 
profitable dimension of their structures. Technical progress, 
media and transport improvement favour markets 
enlargement and increase general demand: this, in turn, is 
reflected by an increase of production and a search for the 
optimal size of competitors. 
The goal is to create scale economies by subdividing the 
fixed production costs onto an ever increasing quantity of 
products, but also to gain advantages in purchases, 
integration of productive processes, production 
diversification, research of funding, creation of distribution 
process, limitation of competition. Not always, though, 
collaboration brings an effective improvement in 
Economical and Financial areas: by increasing enterprise 
dimensions, scale diseconomies could occur, like 
organizational inefficiencies, bureaucracy, managerial limits, 
overproduction and so on. This makes it necessary to modify 
the enterprise structure, by reducing or restructuring it, in 
order to make it economical. 
Other elements that further accelerated this process, also 
in the sectors of services and commerce, are: the tendency 
towards a standardization in consumptions for industrialized 
countries, the incredible development of Information 
Technologies, the introduction of Euro currency. The 
mentioned sectors, during the past decades suffered less from 
the competition of multinational operators. 
The small and medium enterprises (SMEs), that didn’t 
achieve a dimension which could have allowed them to 
effectively compete with the multinational groups, had to 
look for aggregation forms. In this way, they could achieve 
scale economies to face competition, while keeping a certain 
level of independency. The driving factors behind the 
creation of links among autonomous enterprises have been: 
the search for an ideal dimension to compete on national and 
international markets and the desire to keep the ownership of 
the enterprises. At the beginning these collaborations among 
enterprises were unstructured configurations, but they soon 
evolved towards more complex and regulated forms, like 
consortiums. 
The spreading of such collaboration forms, that were 
sometimes considered unfit for the scarce stability of links 
among the participants, didn’t  prevent the process of 
creation of entrepreneurship groups, formed by merger and 
acquisitions. This particularly happened in those sectors in 
which the opportunity of a strategic and operative centralized 
guidance, is higher. 
Many operations of concentration among enterprises 
have been favored by the fact that many of them belonged to 
the same consortium; they have been able to know each 
other and to make some of their processes homogeneous and 
to analyze possible complementarities and synergies.  
This kind of connections have been for the SMEs an 
effective way of successfully competing, while retaining a 
good degree of independence.. 
In order to empirically study how an enterprise network 
is formed among SMEs, an agent based model is used. Agent 
based simulation is an effective paradigm for studying 
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complex systems. It allows the creation of virtual societies, 
in which each agent can interact with others basing on 
certain rules. In this way, a social system can be observed as 
if it were a laboratory study, by repeating the experiments all 
the needed times, and changing just some parameters, by 
leaving all the others still (coeteris paribus analysis), 
something that would be impossible in the real system. The 
agents are basic entities, endowed with the capacity of 
performing certain actions, and with certain variables 
defining their state. In the model presented here, the agents 
are reactive, meaning that they simply react to the stimuli 
coming from the environment and from other agents, without 
cognitively elaborating their own strategies. An agent based 
model consists of a multitude of software agents (both 
homogeneous or heterogeneous), each type being endowed 
with particular local properties and rules, put together within 
an environment, formally described as a set of parameters 
and rules. When the model is formally built and 
implemented, emergent results can be observed, thus 
inferring cause-effect relations by simulating different core 
scenarios. 
In the present work, social network theory is briefly 
analyzed. Then, the comprehensive agent based model used 
is formally introduced, and it is discussed how it can be 
employed to study how a network among enterprises arises, 
when the firms individually do not feature a size allowing 
them to compete with the biggest companies. Some 
empirical results coming from the model are given and the 
future work in this direction is discussed.   
II. SOCIAL NETWORKS 
A social network is a social structure made of nodes 
(which are generally individuals or organizations) that are 
tied by one or more specific types of interdependency, such 
as values, visions, ideas, financial exchange, friendship. 
Social network analysis views social relationships in terms of 
nodes and ties. Nodes are the individual actors within the 
networks, and ties are the relationships between the actors. 
These concepts are often displayed in a social network 
diagram, where nodes are the points and ties are the lines. 
The idea of drawing a picture (called a “sociogram”) of 
who is connected to whom for a specific set of people is 
credited to. Moreno 33, an early social psychologist who 
envisioned mapping the entire population of New York City. 
Cultural anthropologists independently invented the notion 
of social networks to provide a new way to think about social 
structure and the concepts of role and position 38, an 
approach that culminated in rigorous algebraic treatments of 
kinship systems 34. At the same time, in mathematics, the 
nascent field of graph theory 27 began to grow rapidly, 
providing the underpinnings for the analytical techniques of 
modern social network analysis. The strategic network 
perspective avers that the embeddedness of enterprises in 
networks of external relationships with other organizations 
holds significant implications for enterprise performance 
25. 
Specifically, since resources and capabilities such as 
access to diverse knowledge 9, pooled resources and 
cooperation 48, are often acquired through networks of 
inter-firm ties, and since access to such resources and 
capabilities influences enterprise performance 45, it is 
important from a strategy perspective to examine the effect 
of network structure on enterprise performance 23. 
Relationships between enterprises and their partners affect 
enterprises’ alliance-building, behaviour and performance 1 
39. There is evidence that enterprises’ network positions 
have an impact on their survival 4, innovativeness 1, 
market share and financial returns 41. However, evidence 
remains mixed on which particular patterns of inter-
organizational relationships are advantageous for enterprises. 
One of the key ideas currently dominating the literature is 
Burt’s 8 open network perspective, according to which an 
enterprise can obtain important performance advantages 
when exploiting relationships to partners that do not maintain 
direct ties among one another. The absence of direct ties 
among a firm’s partners (the presence of structural holes) 
indicates that these partners are located in different parts of 
an industry network, that they are connected to 
heterogeneous sources of information, and that their 
invitations to jointly exploit business prospects present the 
focal enterprise with access to diverse deal-making 
opportunities 32. Several studies have shown that 
enterprises improve their performance as a result of 
maintaining relationships, whereas other studies have shown 
negative performance effects of firms’ maintaining positions 
in open networks 15. 
The evidence reviewed shows that network 
configurations are dynamic and principally guided by the 
choices of partners and their network management 
capabilities and are beyond the direct influence of policy 
intervention. The evidence suggests that network 
infrastructures can have an indirect positive or negative 
impact on network configurations and can consequently 
encourage or hinder the development of certain forms of 
network relationships. 
A. Connections and link formations 
The tie formation represents the type of relationship 
among the actors thanks to the connection existence and the 
typology of the link, a small group of actors become a 
network. Many analysts adopt a “relational “or “social 
cohesion” approach that focuses on the direct and indirect 
connections among actors. There are two kind of approach 
that describe how the actors decide to start and develop the 
connection with other actors. First approach explains certain 
behaviors or processes through the fact of social connectivity 
itself, as well as through the density, strength, symmetry, 
rage, and so on, of the ties that bind firms’ relationships may 
be symbiotic, the resources accessed and status obtained 
through one tie making ties with other firms possible and/or 
valuable 39 45. Partnering decisions are also influenced 
by strategic considerations such as the ability to play one 
partner off against another 9 43 48, the desire to create 
an appropriate mix of new and old ties 28 7, or the need 
to maintain a manageable alliance portfolio size 30 and 
composition 17.  
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Another important line of network research employing 
relational analysis concerns itself with process of recruitment 
to social movements. Its point of departure is a study 44 
that suggest how individuals with pre-existing with other 
actors are more likely to be contacted and recruited than 
individuals without such ties are; individual with few or 
weak ties to alternative networks are more likely to respond 
favourably to these recruitment efforts compared with 
individuals with strong commitments to countervailing 
network.. 
Within networks, the evolving pattern of relationships – 
the network structure – shapes opportunities and constraints. 
Adopting Burt’s definitions 10, the pattern of network ties 
surrounding social actors is a “causal spark” that can 
promote or hinder action. Networks take shape as actors 
enter into collaborative relations based on information about 
the quality, trustworthiness and status of potential partners 
obtained through experiences in their own and their partners’ 
past relationships.  
Partner selection research examines mechanisms of 
relationship formation and thus provides knowledge of how 
network structures emerge and change. In this context, firms 
treats partner selection as a risk-uncertainty problem. 
Specifically, firms’ decision makers are conceived to follow 
a logic of reducing uncertainty and risk in their exchanges by 
engaging past partners in repeated ties and forming new ties 
with partners’ partners based on referrals 37 26, rather 
than seeking riskier and more uncertain non-local ties 
beyond these bounds 5 29. As a result of this preference 
for ties with past partners and their partners, firms’ ties tend 
to congeal into dense, stable, and constraining local clusters 
47 24. Thus, partner selection research tends to 
emphasize inertia in partner choice and network stabilizing 
mechanisms 12 29. 
Relatively partner selection several researches emphasize 
myopic partnering and network inertia 38 12 21. 
However, decision makers do not inevitably reproduce their 
past relationships 2 36. As a result of its focus on the risk 
and uncertainty reduction partnering logic, partner selection 
research supplies few insights into the forces driving partner 
and network change. Baum et al. 6 attempted to generalize 
the risk-avoidance model of partner selection by adopting the 
performance feedback model from organizational learning to 
specify conditions under which risk-taking is more or less 
likely to occur, and thus the conditions under which firms’ 
decision makers would select new partners and change their 
network. 
Consistent with learning theory predictions, the risk and 
uncertainty avoidance pattern of partnering with past 
partners and their partners was more likely when firm 
reached its performance aspirations, but more likely to select 
partners with which it had no prior direct or indirect contact 
when performance fell below aspirations, or greatly 
exceeded them. 
Study of tie dissolution is needed to augment models of 
network dynamics, as the implications of partnering patterns 
will remain clear until termination patterns are better 
understood 42. 
B. Local links and clusters 
Local link formation implies that new partners are found 
through an actors’ existing network and that the new partners 
is already known to other partners “in the neighborhood”. 
The overall network structure resulting from local link 
formation is a network composed of dense “cliques” of 
actors, which indicates that they are highly connected to each 
other. Having a more central and autonomous structural 
position in a network provides firms with access to 
resources, learning opportunities and reduces uncertainty. 
Regarding the formation of new linkages Gulati 22 finds 
that the process of new tie creation is heavily embedded in 
an actors’ existing network: this means that new ties are 
often formed with prior partners or with partners of prior 
partners, indicating network growth to be a “ local” process, 
where strategic collaboration are path dependant 34. 
Particularly when considering inter-firm alliances, new link 
formation is considered “risky business” and actors prefer 
alliances that are embedded in a dense clique were norms are 
more likely to be enforceable and opportunistic behaviour to 
be punished 22 39 20 3. 
However, distant link formation implies that new 
linkages are created with partners whom are not known to 
the existing partners of an actor. In the social sciences, 
Grannovetter 19 was the first to differentiate between local 
ties in dense cliques (strong ties) and distant ties that bridge 
these cliques (weak ties). More precisely, the author argue 
that distant linkages “serve as crucial functions in linking 
otherwise unconnected segment of the network” 18. At the 
level of the firm, Burt 9 shows that distant linkages that 
serve as bridges between dense local cliques of firms, can 
provide access to new source of information and favourable 
strategic negotiations positions (“structural holes”), which 
improves the firms” position in the network and industry. 
 
C. Strenght of weak ties 
“The strength of weak ties,” is the title of a 1973 article 
by Granovetter 18: weak ties as a concept describes the 
nature of a relationship between nodes in terms of the 
consequences for an entire network. Hence “weak ties” 
serves as a bridge between concepts that describe 
relationships and those that describe entire networks. Perhaps 
the most authoritative statement of the idea is Granovetter’s 
1982 reprise 19. “…Our acquaintances (“weak ties”) are 
less likely to be socially involved with one another than are 
our close friends (“strong ties”). Thus the set of people make 
up on any individual and his acquaintances will constitute a 
low-density network (one in which many of the possible ties 
are absent), whereas the set consisting of the same individual 
and his close friends will be densely knit. Ego will have a 
collection of close friends, most of whom are in touch with 
one another – a dense “clump” of social structure. Ego will 
[also] have a collection of acquaintances, few of whom know 
one another. Each of these acquaintances, however, is likely 
to have close friends in his or her own right and therefore to 
be enmeshed in a closely knit clump of social structure, but 
one different from Ego’s…”. 
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Weak ties have two characteristics: 
weak ties facilitate the flow of information from 
otherwise distant parts of a network; 
weak ties help to integrate social systems. 
We will analyze each details. 
1)Weak ties facilitate the flow of information from 
otherwise distant parts of a network: individuals with few 
weak ties will be deprived of information from distant parts 
of the social system and will be confined to the provincial 
news and views of their close friends. 
2) Weak ties help to integrate social systems: social 
systems lacking in weak ties will be fragmented and 
incoherent. New ideas will spread slowly, scientific 
endeavours will be limited and subgroups that are separated 
by race, ethnicity, geography or other characteristics will 
have difficulty reaching a modus vivendi 19.  
The importance of weak ties is asserted to be that. This 
ties are disproportionately likely to be bridges as compared 
to strong ties, which should be underrepresented in that role. 
This does not preclude the possibility that most weak ties 
have no such function. It must be the case that (1) something 
flows through these bridges – they actually serve as conduits 
bearing information and influence to groups they otherwise 
would not get, and (2) whatever it is that flows actually plays 
some important role in the network. A flow can occur only 
under some circumstances. Passing along information or 
exercising influence should not be too costly to the weak tie 
that constitutes the bridge, otherwise, strong ties that are 
willing to bear the cost will be more effective in making the 
bridge.  
Granovetter’s 18 20 influential “strength of weak ties” 
thesis maintains that weak ties are often more important in 
spreading information or resource because they tend to serve 
as bridges between otherwise disconnected social group; 
strong ties lead to less efficient transmission processes 
because a large number of actors in the strong tie network 
also know each other, as well as knowing the focal actor. 
To clarify the relevance of tie strength it will be useful to 
consider two dimension social relationships: information and 
influence. Collaboration thus requires, first and foremost, 
that corporate actors have access to information. Consistent 
with the “strength-of weak ties’ thesis, both the transmission 
rate and availability of such disparate information will be 
higher for individuals relying on weak network ties rather 
than strong ties. 
 
D. From weak ties to clustering 
 
Within a social network, enterprises can generate clusters 
characterized by stronger ties 
Clustering is definable as the tendency of vertically 
and/or horizontally integrated firms in related lines of 
business to concentrate geographically, or, to a more general 
extent, virtually 11. 
Cluster policies are an example of pro-active industrial 
policy with shared responsibilities among actors; besides, the 
agglomeration of firms and their suppliers can confer 
competitive advantage to the enterprises involved. 
There are many social and economic reasons leading to 
clusters creation. The main economic drivers of cluster 
formation in particular industries include 14: 
proximity to markets. Despite low-cost international 
transportation, being near to markets can be important in 
cluster development (products that are not easy to transport, 
that require continuous interaction with customers).  
Supplies of specialised labour. The existence of 
specialised pools of labour, such as occur around many 
universities. 
Presence of input and equipment suppliers. A high 
frequency of exchanges between co-located capital goods 
producers and users. 
Availability of specific natural resources. 
Economies of scale in production. Such economies may 
allow only a small number of efficient-scale plants in a given 
market. 
Availability of infrastructure. Some types of 
infrastructure may also be quite specific, such as with certain 
transport or tourist facilities, further encouraging 
agglomeration. 
Low transaction costs. When firms and their suppliers 
operate near to each other, and the frequency of interaction is 
high, the costs of negotiation and contract enforcement may 
be reduced.  
As a consequence, there is an improvement of 
information access. This is straightforward: when many 
enterprise are integrated, than the information system is 
usually shared or, if individually managed, it allows an easier 
communication among them. Enterprises, when aggregated 
in clusters, can share, for example: product and market 
information, product design, marketing policies, training, 
recruitment services, human resources, skills, purchasing 
(lower prices for raw material and supplies), transportation 
and delivery (for geographical clusters), quality control, 
testing facilities, financing (credit guarantees at collective 
level), sponsorships 49. Many of the mentioned can be 
considered as “competences”. That’s why the model takes as 
its basic unit for link creation the generic “competence 
exchange” among two enterprises. Of course this is true 
during the external exploration phase, where an enterprise is 
looking for the best partner to create a new link, or to 
strengthen an existing one. Though, also the internal 
exploration is very important since it can allow an enterprise 
to develop a new competence, that will be used later on to be 
exchanged, thus constituting a new link with another firm 
31. 
The price-independent preferences of both the market 
and its participants are based on each ones perception of the 
other rather than the market simply being the sum of all its 
participants actions as is usually the case. So, the cluster 
effect is a usually cited example of emergence. 
 
III. NON EQUITY COLLABORATIONS: CONSORTIUM IN 
ITALIAN EXPERIENCE 
Before Non equity organizations  (consortiums in various 
juridical forms) are one of the most widely used ways for 
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setting up formalized collaborations among the enterprises 
that aim to share resources and results, with the goal of 
reaching economies of scale (both financial and related to 
knowledge). 
A consortium has the goal of creating value for the 
enterprises part of it, even when they also have external 
activities and create product and services not only for the 
other participants. 
The choice of formalizing collaborations derives from 
some basic choices and reasons; the opportunity of disposing 
of a structure which is co-participated by others, on which to 
converge financial resources, both immaterial and material 
ones, where these are significant. 
Another important element is the need of creating rules 
for controlling the contributions of associates, and the 
benefits to be divided among them, along with rights and 
modes for material and non material assets to be gained. 
When collaborative forms get more significant and 
pervasive for the value chain, the enterprises should count on 
clear and well defined rules, able to reinforce the trust 
towards the consortium and the associates. 
These fundamental aims are to keep into the highest 
consideration when managing consorted forms since, if they 
are perceived as not properly correspondent or protected by 
the consortium they could bring to situations of crisis, with 
consequences in terms of efficacy and efficiency or even 
with the risk of dissolution of the consortium itself 13. 
The advantages that enterprises, especially if small and 
medium dimensions, can derive from non equity forms of 
collaboration lie in the possibility of using the consorted 
form to share investments, higher external visibility and 
share and leverage reciprocal knowledge. 
When facing deep changes in the competitive scenarios, 
that require an higher innovation and internationalization to 
compete successfully, the more pro-active SMEs 46 search 
for collaborative forms that, though preserving as much as 
possible their independence, allow them to react to the 
challenges of the globalization. 
It is possible to observe that many investments made by 
consortiums among SMEs are mainly centered – particularly 
in recent years – on fields considered more risky, since 
characterized by an higher intangible content (e.g. research 
and development, promotion of collective brands, 
internationalization projects and so on). 
These investments are less easily accessible by individual 
SMEs, both for the high financial amount and for the higher 
difficulties in obtaining funds with the usual forms of getting 
into debts. The financial constrain often represents a non 
negligible problem for SMEs, when facing medium term 
investment programs, considered at high risk, for which it’s 
difficult to set “asset financing” operations. 
Besides in some countries, like Italy, non equity forms 
like consortiums can have some financial and fiscal 
facilitations. 
Being able to share operative and financial risks, by 
reaching a critical mass of investments, allowing the 
enterprises to pursue the creation of strategic intangible 
resources in their industries is a primary goal in formalized 
forms of cooperation, but in order to realize efficient 
programs it is necessary to have a common orientation to 
address resources and strengths towards goals with returns 
that are not necessarily in the short period, thus supporting 
the risk. 
Non equity forms also have among their primary goals 
that of realizing a politics of knowledge management, 
facilitating the bi-directional flows both between the 
consortium and its associates, and among the associates 
themselves. Consortiums also feature some points of 
weakness, that could invalidate their efficiency and the 
capability to evolve in line with the needs of the market in 
which they operate. 
An issue is that of the short term orientation. The links 
within a consortium are often weaker than equity ones, and 
this can bring to decisions oriented to the short term, in order 
to get a wider consensus and avoid the recess of the 
participants, thus scarifying longer term programs. 
In order to limit such problematic it’s advisable an 
accurate selection of the participants and, in order to keep 
common strategic orientations, the creation of statutory rules 
that punish opportunistic behaviors or situations of 
decisional stall. 
Another limit is the need of having a wide consensus 
among the associates to take decisions, with insufficient 
proxy for managerial organisms. This limit is embedded into 
many non equity organizations, since the convinced adhesion 
of a significant part of the associates is appropriate so that, 
also individually, they carried on what decided and designed 
for the whole consortium.  
If the associates perceive the consortium as a distant 
reality or merely prescriptive, they could slow down or 
compromise the realization of common strategies or worsen 
the image of the alliance, also abroad, as a strategic group. 
In order to conjugate a wide consensus and decisional 
rapidity the consortium should have clear and accepted rules, 
but it’s also necessary that an effective communication 
strategy is carried on for strategies and activities. 
Trust is an essential value for “hyperarchic” 
organizations 16, both towards the directional organisms 
and towards other participants to the consortium. This kind 
of trust regards various aspects, among which also the 
expectations about the life-span of the consortium itself, that 
shouldn’t be lower than the time needed to realize the set 
goals. 
A rule system that, even allowing flexibility and 
dynamism to the individual enterprises, could sanction 
opportunistic behaviors – that would harm the consortium – 
can contribute to keep an atmosphere of reciprocal trust. The 
enterprises accept to give sensible information, to delegate 
strategic functions of their value chain, if and only if the trust 
is not mined. 
A controversial topic about non equity links is about their 
capability of facilitating integrations among the associates, 
with the typical M&A dynamics. 
Belonging to the same consortium can actually facilitate 
the aggregation among the associates, to the extent of 
creating real clusters. The main reasons are: 
the higher knowledge created among the participants, 
compared to that towards external enterprises 
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a wider process uniformity among the consorted 
enterprises, that usually is realized with the adoption of 
common procedures, suppliers, technology and brands 
the interest of the whole consortium if favoring 
integration process among associates, in order to avoid the 
acquisition by other external enterprises 
The two initial motivations especially regard the 
reduction of informative asymmetries and the reduction of 
costs and risks of the integration process, that are among the 
most frequent causes of failure for M&A operations.  
Speaking about the interest of the consortium in keeping 
knowledge, market and financial resources within its 
structure, this strategy finds a counter altar in the opportunity 
of avoiding dimensional imbalance, that would affect the 
governance. 
The two opposed needs find realization in rules that, on 
the one side make easier such operations among the 
associates, when compared to those regarding external 
player. On the other side they avoid that the excessive 
contractual and corporative power of a consortium could 
lower the sense of belonging for those associates that are not 
the bigger ones. 
 
IV. THE AGENT BASED MODEL 
The model has been developed by prof. Marco Pironti 
and dr. Marco Remondino, at the e-Business L@B, 
University of Turin. It is built in pure Java, thus following 
the Object Oriented paradigm. This is particularly suitable 
for agent based modelling, since the individual agents can be 
seen as objects coming from a prototypal class, interacting 
among them basing on the internal rules (methods). While 
the reactive nature of the agents may seem a limitation, it’s 
indeed a way to keep track of the aggregate behaviour of a 
large number of entities acting in the same system at the 
same time. All the numerical parameters can be decided at 
the beginning of each simulation (e.g.: number of 
enterprises, and so on). 
Everything in the model is seen as an agent; thus we have 
three kinds of agents: Environment, Enterprises and 
Emissaries (E³). This is done since each of them, even the 
environment, is endowed with some actions to perform. 
 
A. Heat Metaphor 
In order to represent the advantage of an enterprise in 
owning different competences, the “heat” metaphor is 
introduced. In agent based models for Economics, the 
metaphor based approach 40 is an established way of 
representing real phenomena through computational and 
physical metaphors. In this case, a quantum of heat is 
assigned for each competence at each simulation turn. If the 
competence is internal (i.e.: developed by the enterprise) this 
value is higher. If the competence is external (i.e.: borrowed 
from another enterprise) this value is lower. This is realistic, 
since in the model we don’t have any form of variable cost 
for competencies, and thus an internal competence is 
rewarded more. Heat is thus a metaphor not only for the 
profit that an enterprise can derive from owning many 
competences, but also for the managing and synergic part 
(e.g.: economy of scale). Heat is also expendable in the 
process of creating new internal competences (internal 
exploration) and of looking for partner with whom to share 
them in exchange of external competences (external 
exploration). At each time-step, a part of the heat is scattered 
(this can be regarded as a set of costs for the enterprise). If 
the individual heat gets under a threshold, the enterprise 
ceases its activity and disappears from the environment. 
At an aggregate level, average environmental heat is a 
good and synthetic measure to monitor the state of the 
system. 
 
The environment is regarded as a meta-agent, representing 
the world in which the proper agents act. It’s considered an 
agent itself, since it can perform some actions on the others 
and on the heat. If features the following properties: a grid 
(X,Y), i.e.: a lattice in the form of a matrix, containing cells; 
a dispersion value, i.e.: a real number used to calculate the 
dissipated heat at each step; the heat threshold under which 
an enterprise ceases; a value defining the infrastructure level 
and quality; a threshold over which new enterprises are 
introduced; a function polling the average heat (of the whole 
grid). The environment affects the heat dispersion over the 
grid and, based on the parameter described above, allows 
new enterprises to join the world. 
 
B. Enterprises 
This is the most important and central type of agent in the 
model. Its behaviour is based on the reactive paradigm, i.e.: 
stimulus-reaction. The goal for these agents is that of 
surviving in the environment (i.e.: never go under the 
minimum allowed heat threshold). They are endowed with a 
heat level (energy) that will be consumed when performing 
actions. They feature a unique ID, a coordinate system (to 
track their position on the lattice), and a real number 
identifying the heat they own. The most important feature of 
the enterprise agent is a matrix identifying which 
competences (processes) it can dispose of. In the first row, 
each position of the vector identifies a specific competence, 
and is equal to 1, if disposed of, or to 0 if lacking. A second 
row is used to identify internal competences or outsourced 
ones (in that case, the ID of the lender is memorized). A third 
row is used to store a value to identify the owned 
competences developed after a phase of internal exploration, 
to distinguish them from those possessed from the beginning. 
Besides, an enterprise can be “settled”, or “not settled”, 
meaning that it joined the world, but is still looking for the 
best position on the territory through its emissary. The 
enterprise features a wired original behaviour: internally or 
externally explorative. This is the default behaviour, the one 
with which an enterprise is born, but it can be changed under 
certain circumstances. This means that an enterprise can be 
naturally oriented to internal explorative strategy (preferring 
to develop new processes internally), but can act the opposite 
way, if it considers it can be more convenient. While in the 
present model the agents are stochastic (with a different 
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probability distribution decided at the beginning of the 
simulation for the two agents’ classes), cognitive agents will 
be added shortly, using reinforcement learning techniques to 
optimize their behaviour and make it more realistic. 
Finally, the enterprise keeps track of its collaborators 
(i.e.: the list of enterprise with whom it is exchanging 
competencies and making synergies) and has a parameters 
defining the minimum number of competencies it expects to 
find, in order to form a joint. The main goal for each 
enterprise is that of acquiring competences, both through 
internal (e.g.: research and development) and external 
exploration (e.g.: forming new links with other enterprises). 
The enterprises are rewarded with heat based on the number 
of competences they possess (different, parameterized 
weights for internal or external ones), that is spread in the 
surrounding territory, thus slowly evaporating, and is used 
for internal and external exploration tasks.  
 
C. Emissaries 
These are agents that strictly belong to the enterprises, 
and are to be seen as probes able to move on the territory and 
detect information about it. They are used in two different 
situation: 1) if the enterprise is not settled yet (just appeared 
on the territory) it’s sent out to find the best place where to 
settle. 2) If the enterprise is already settled and chooses to 
explore externally, an emissary is sent out to find the best 
possible partners. In both cases, the emissary, that has a field 
of vision limited to the surrounding 8 cells, probes the 
territory for heat and moves following the hottest cells. 
When it finds an enterprise in a cell, it probes its 
competencies and compares them to those possessed by its 
chief enterprise verifying if these are a good complement 
(according to the parameter described in the previous 
section). In the first case, the enterprise is settled in a cell 
which is near the best enterprise found during the movement. 
In the second case, the enterprise asks the best found for 
collaboration). A link is created among two enterprises if at 
least one competence may be exchanged among them. Be 
CM(a) the competences missed by enterprise a, and CM(b) 
those missed by enterprise b, the exchanged number of 
competences will be the minimum between CM(a) and 
CM(b). The strength of the link among two enterprises will 
be proportional to the number of exchanged competences, 
and will vary during the simulation (e.g.: after enterprise a 
acquires a new competence that b is missing and vice versa). 
While moving, the emissary consumes a quantum of heat, 
that is directly dependant on the quality of infrastructures of 
the environment. 
 
D. Main Iterations 
The main iterations for the simulation model are 
described in this section. 
At step 0, a lattice is created (X, Y). A number n of 
enterprises are created, k of them internally explorative and 
n-k of them externally explorative. X, Y, n, and k are set by 
the user, before the simulation starts. 
At step 1, the environment checks if some enterprise 
reached the minimum heat threshold; if so, removes it from 
the world. After that, each enterprise, if idle (not doing 
anything) decides what behaviour to follow. 
At step 2, all the enterprises that selected to be EE move 
their emissary by one cell. All the IE ones work on the R&D 
cycle (one step at a time). 
At step 3, the EE enterprises check if the emissary 
finished its energy and, in that case, ask the best found 
enterprise for collaboration (they can receive a positive or 
negative reply, based on the needs of the other enterprise). 
The IE enterprises check if R&D process is finished and, in 
that case, get a competence in a random position (that can be 
already occupied by an owned competences, thus wasting the 
work done). 
At step 4, the environment scatters the heat according to 
its parameters. Loop from step 1. 
 
V. QUALITATIVE RESULTS 
 
While the main object of this paper is to present the 
model itself as a tool for studying the aggregation into 
networks of SMEs, in the present paragraph some insights 
will be given about preliminary results obtained from the 
model itself. The presented ones will be mainly qualitative 
results, although the model can give many quantitative 
individual and aggregate results.  
 
The model can give the following different kinds of 
outputs, when running in “normal” mode: 
1) a real-time graph, depicting the social network, in 
which the nodes are the enterprises, whose colour represent 
the behaviour they are following at a given step, and the 
links are the ties indicating two or more enterprises mutually 
exchanging one or more competences. 
2) A set of charts, showing in real time some core 
parameters, namely: average heat in the environment, 
number of links (in the network), number of links (average), 
number of enterprises doing internal exploration, number of 
ceased enterprises since the beginning, number of born 
enterprises since the beginning, number of available 
competences (overall), total number of skills possessed at the 
beginning, obtained by external exploration, obtained by 
internal exploration. 
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Figure 1.  Figure 1: Network formation 
 
In figure 1, an existing district is analyzed (A1); the 
enterprises are mainly small sized ones, and some 
collaborations already exist. The evolution (A2) is carried on 
by the model, by considering the introduction of new players 
in the market. Since internal research and development is 
often too expensive for SMEs, the tendency is that of 
creating new links thus creating a cluster, in which the 
enterprises exchange their competences. Though, they 
remain autonomous, in the sense that no enterprise is 
acquired by another one.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Figure 2: Many non-equity links 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Figure 3: Same scenario after 2 simulated years 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Small and medium enterprises often have to face the 
fierce competition coming from bigger and wealthier 
companies. One of the most effective policies to overcome 
this threat is that of organizing themselves into networks and 
clusters, while maintaining a good level of independency. 
The second aspect regards spending resources like time 
and money: the development of new internal processes is 
usually time and resource consuming and is difficult to 
attain, especially when referring to radical cases. Though, 
SMEs often build a network for competences exchange 
among them, and a very important variable when considering 
the strategies performed by an enterprise; once possessed, 
the advantage can be exploited or shared. In the first case, 
the enterprise can gain customers and money, by being the 
only one (or among the few ones) possessing it. But it risks 
to lose its advantage as soon as other players can develop it. 
Another strategy is that of sharing the process innovation, in 
exchange for other competencies and/or money. 
Non equity forms of collaboration, realized through 
formalized structures (like consortiums) can carry on an 
important function for SMEs competitiveness. 
The growing competition, introduced by market 
globalization, is an important motivation to realize 
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aggregative forms that, by preserving the independence of 
individual enterprises, allow to make less penalizing the 
limits due to the small dimension and consequence financial 
limits. 
Consortiums can also carry on investments in material 
and, most of all, immaterial activities, and in projects with a 
higher risks, that would be difficultly faceable by an 
individual enterprise. 
Investments for technological innovation, 
internationalization and communication can constitute an 
effective help for associates. However it’s necessary that, 
besides a keen selection of the participants, also clear and 
shared rules are defined, for the consortium itself and the use 
of consorted goods and services. 
This regulation should grant the consortium operative 
and decisional slenderness, though preserving a strong sense 
of participation for the associates and deterring opportunistic 
behaviors by the participants, that could mine the trust 
towards central organization and the associates themselves. 
Trust is indeed a fundamental value in such 
organizations, in order to preserve a strategic medium term 
trend and to allow the enterprises to adhere to the politics 
decided within the consortium and delegate to it some 
strategic functions of their value chain. 
Also the role of favoring equity links among the 
participants is not to be underestimated. The associates that 
with the time being have improved their reciprocal 
knowledge and uniformed some management processes can 
thus reduce the risks of informative asymmetry and 
integration, typical of the M&A actions. 
In this work a model is presented, allowing to analyze the 
main dynamics behind this phenomenon, by varying some 
core parameters. 
A well established network can attract new players, that 
will probably bring new knowledge and competences in it. 
The model is formally discussed in detail, and so the 
agents composing it. While studying quantitative results is 
beyond the purpose of this work, a qualitative analysis is 
briefly described, and the network graph, one of the 
graphical outputs supplied by the model, is analyzed: in 
order to show how network dynamics emerge from the 
model and its parameters, settable by the user. 
The model is comprehensive and its scope is wide. In 
future works other features will be described in detail, and 
quantitative analysis will be carried on in order to study real-
world cases (e.g.: existing industrial districts and so on) and 
the underlying dynamics that lead to their creations. 
Besides, a new feature will be implemented in the model, 
referred to as “shock mode”, allowing the user to stop the 
model at a given step, and change some inner parameter. For 
example, it will be possible to add a specific competence to 
one enterprise only, so that it’s the only one in all the 
network possessing it. In that way it becomes possible to 
study how and based on which dynamics this specific 
competence spreads on the network and which kind of 
competitive advantage it gives, in terms of central position in 
the network and bargaining power to obtain other 
competences not possessed internally. 
Another very interesting future research will regard the 
implementation of game-theoretical like dynamics into 
collaboration domain. The agents will be embedded with a 
form of reinforcement learning and will change their own 
strategy according to a perception, biased according to their 
original belief and predisposition. 
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